## Citation

*Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 2026 IL 132066 (Ill. Sept. 24, 2026).

## Material facts

On April 19, 2022, Mark Geller requested an Uber ride. Driver Ejaz Rathore lost control on an expressway; the resulting crash fatally injured both men. Gloria Sheridan Geller (Sheridan), Mark’s widow and independent estate administrator, sued Rathore and Uber Technologies, Inc., together with its subsidiary Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), alleging driver negligence, Uber’s vicarious liability, negligence through res ipsa loquitur, survival claims, and wrongful death claims for Mark’s statutory next of kin. (¶¶ 1, 6.)

Mark and Sheridan separately accepted Uber agreements containing arbitration provisions. Sheridan’s agreement covered disputes involving her access, use, or relationship with Uber, including third-party claims related to her use; it also assigned threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator. (¶¶ 8–9.) Sheridan appeared in three distinct capacities: individual Uber user, wrongful death beneficiary, and estate representative suing nominally for beneficiaries. (¶¶ 24–25.)

## Procedural history

The Cook County circuit court compelled arbitration of survival claims under Mark’s agreement, denied arbitration of wrongful death claims under Sheridan’s agreement, and stayed the latter pending survival arbitration. The estate then voluntarily dismissed the survival claims. (¶ 10.)

Uber took an interlocutory appeal. The First District reversed, rejecting procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges and holding that Sheridan’s delegation clause required an arbitrator to decide wrongful death arbitrability. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the estate’s appeal and reviewed the arbitration denial de novo. (¶¶ 11, 15–16, 20.)

## Issues

Did Sheridan clearly and unmistakably agree to delegate arbitrability of wrongful death claims arising from Mark’s Uber use? If delegation failed, did her agreement require arbitration of the underlying wrongful death dispute? The estate also challenged the appellate court’s treatment of beneficiary ownership and unconscionability. (¶¶ 18, 29.)

## Holding and reasoning

Both arbitration questions were answered negatively: the court must decide arbitrability, and these wrongful death claims are not arbitrable. (¶¶ 29, 70, 72–74.)

Wrongful death creates a cause of action accruing at death for beneficiaries’ losses; survival preserves claims already accrued to the decedent for his injuries before death. Wrongful death recovery belongs to beneficiaries, not the decedent’s estate, so Mark’s agreement could constrain survival claims without constraining wrongful death claims. Sheridan’s representative status did not merge these distinct interests or her contractual capacities. (¶¶ 24–28.)

Delegation is itself an antecedent arbitration agreement. Courts must first determine whether parties clearly and unmistakably consented to delegate the particular arbitrability dispute; ordinary contractual consent remains essential. Sheridan’s delegation language and incorporated AAA rules did not overcome contractual language repeatedly tying arbitration to her own Uber use. The wrongful death dispute arose solely from Mark’s use. (¶¶ 35–36, 38–45.)

FAA section 2 reinforced that conclusion by requiring a controversy arising from the relevant contract or transaction; Mark’s distinct use failed that threshold for Sheridan’s agreement. (¶¶ 47–49.) *Henry Schein* prohibits courts from disregarding an established delegation because arbitration appears wholly groundless. This decision instead resolved antecedent consent. *New Prime* preserves judicial examination of FAA authority, and *Coinbase* requires courts first to determine the governing agreement. (¶¶ 52, 54–60, 62–63.)

After resolving delegation, the court separately rejected arbitration of the underlying claims. Sheridan did not sign Mark’s agreement, and her own agreement signaled no consent, as beneficiary or representative, to arbitrate wrongful death arising from another person’s use. Uber established neither beneficiary nor estate consent. (¶¶ 72–74.)

## Disposition and limits

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment, affirmed the circuit court, and remanded. Wrongful death proceedings may resume; survival counts remain voluntarily dismissed. (¶¶ 76–79.) It expressly declined to reach procedural or substantive unconscionability. (¶ 74.) Its holding rests on this agreement and these distinct uses and capacities; the court acknowledged a fine distinction between delegation scope and consent, and inconsistent decisions elsewhere. (¶¶ 67, 76.)
