## Citation

Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 IL 132066 (Ill. Sept. 24, 2026). Sheridan appealed as independent administrator of Mark Geller’s estate. (¶¶ 1–3.)

## Material facts

On April 19, 2022, Mark requested an Uber ride. His driver, Ejaz Rathore, lost control on an expressway; the crash fatally injured both men. Sheridan, Mark’s spouse and estate administrator, sued Uber Technologies, Inc., its subsidiary Rasier, LLC, and Rathore, alleging driver negligence, Uber’s vicarious liability, negligence through res ipsa loquitur, survival claims, and wrongful death claims for Mark’s statutory next of kin. (¶¶ 1, 6.)

Mark and Sheridan individually accepted separate Uber agreements. Sheridan’s agreement covered disputes connected to her own use, access, and relationship with Uber, including third-party claims related to her use. It delegated threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator and incorporated AAA rules. (¶¶ 8–9, 42–43.)

## Procedural history

Uber sought dismissal or, alternatively, a stay and an order compelling arbitration. The circuit court compelled arbitration of survival claims under Mark’s agreement, denied arbitration of wrongful death claims, and stayed those claims pending survival arbitration. The estate then voluntarily dismissed its survival actions. (¶¶ 7, 10.)

Uber took an interlocutory appeal. The appellate court found Sheridan’s agreement neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and concluded its delegation clause required the arbitrator to decide whether wrongful death claims were arbitrable. It reversed and remanded; the Illinois Supreme Court allowed the estate’s appeal and reviewed the circuit court’s denial de novo. (¶¶ 11, 13–16, 20.)

## Issues

Did Sheridan clearly and unmistakably agree to delegate arbitrability of wrongful death claims arising from Mark’s Uber use? If not, did her agreement require arbitration of the underlying wrongful death dispute? (¶ 29.)

## Holding and reasoning

No on both questions. The court first had to decide whether the parties consented to delegate this dispute; absent that consent, the court also decided that the wrongful death claims were not subject to arbitration. (¶¶ 29, 70, 72–74.)

Sheridan occupied three distinct capacities: individual Uber user, wrongful death beneficiary, and estate personal representative. As representative, she was a nominal plaintiff acting for the spouse and any other next of kin, the true beneficiaries. Wrongful death creates a claim accruing at death for beneficiaries’ losses; survival preserves claims already accrued to the decedent. Wrongful death recoveries are not estate assets subject to restriction through Mark’s arbitration agreement. (¶¶ 24–28.)

Delegation is itself an antecedent arbitration agreement. Courts require clear and unmistakable evidence of consent to delegate arbitrability and resolve disputes over formation before enforcing delegation. Sheridan’s delegation language and AAA incorporation did not establish consent concerning another person’s use: read in context, the agreement repeatedly tied arbitration to her own services and contractual relationship. (¶¶ 35–44.)

FAA section 2 reinforced that contractual connection because the wrongful death dispute arose exclusively from Mark’s separate use. Henry Schein bars a court from rejecting an agreed delegation merely because arbitration seems wholly groundless; it preserves the antecedent judicial inquiry into whether delegation was agreed. The court read New Prime and Coinbase as likewise requiring foundational judicial examination of statutory authority and the parties’ actual agreement. (¶¶ 47–49, 54–60, 62–63.)

For underlying arbitration, Sheridan did not agree in her beneficiary or representative capacity to arbitrate claims arising from Mark’s use, was a nonsignatory to his agreement, and had no corresponding commitment in her individual agreement. Uber therefore failed to establish consent to arbitrate the wrongful death dispute itself. (¶¶ 73–74.)

## Disposition and limits

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment, affirmed the circuit court, and remanded. Wrongful death proceedings may resume in circuit court; survival counts remain voluntarily dismissed. The court expressly declined procedural and substantive unconscionability arguments. (¶¶ 74, 76–79.)

The decision rests on Sheridan’s agreement and these claims’ source. The court acknowledged a fine line between delegation scope and consent, and inconsistent decisions. Wrongful death liability remains for further proceedings. (¶¶ 67, 76.)