## Citation

*Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc.*, 2026 IL 132066, Illinois Supreme Court, opinion filed September 24, 2026 (caption; ¶¶ 1–3).

## Material facts

On April 19, 2022, Mark Geller requested an Uber ride. Driver Ejaz Rathore lost control on an expressway; the crash fatally injured both men. The complaint alleged Rathore’s negligence and Uber’s vicarious liability, asserting survival and wrongful death claims and negligence through res ipsa loquitur. Defendants included Uber Technologies, Inc., its subsidiary Rasier, LLC, collectively termed Uber, and Rathore (¶¶ 1, 6).

Gloria Sheridan Geller, Mark’s spouse, acted as independent administrator and wrongful death beneficiary. These capacities differed from her capacity as an individual Uber user. As personal representative, she was the nominal plaintiff pursuing wrongful death claims for statutory beneficiaries, including herself and any other next of kin (¶¶ 24–25).

Mark and Sheridan separately accepted Uber agreements containing arbitration provisions. Sheridan’s agreement addressed her own use, access, and relationship with Uber; third-party claims were covered when related to her use. It also assigned threshold arbitrability questions to an arbitrator and incorporated AAA rules and the FAA (¶¶ 8–9, 42–43).

## Procedural history

The estate filed its nine-count, third-amended complaint in Cook County on February 21, 2023. Uber moved to dismiss or alternatively stay proceedings and compel arbitration (¶¶ 6–7).

The circuit court compelled arbitration of survival claims under Mark’s agreement, denied arbitration of wrongful death claims, and initially stayed those claims pending survival arbitration. It then granted the estate’s voluntary dismissal of the survival actions (¶ 10).

Uber appealed interlocutorily. The appellate court rejected procedural and substantive unconscionability challenges and held that Sheridan’s delegation clause required an arbitrator to determine whether the wrongful death claims were arbitrable. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the estate’s appeal and reviewed the circuit court’s denial de novo (¶¶ 11, 15–16, 20).

## Issues

Did Sheridan clearly and unmistakably agree to delegate arbitrability of wrongful death claims arising from Mark’s Uber use? If she did not, did her agreement nevertheless require arbitration of the underlying wrongful death dispute (¶ 29)?

## Holding and reasoning

The court answered both questions no. Wrongful death creates a claim accruing at death for beneficiaries’ losses; survival preserves claims accruing to the decedent before death. Wrongful death recovery is not an asset of the decedent’s estate subject to limitation through his arbitration agreement. Mark’s agreement therefore did not govern these wrongful death claims (¶¶ 26–29).

Delegation is itself an agreement requiring consent. Courts must first determine whether clear and unmistakable evidence establishes agreement to delegate the particular arbitrability dispute; ordinary contract-formation principles govern that inquiry (¶¶ 35–41). Sheridan’s delegation clause, read within the arbitration section, remained tied to her own use. Neither broad delegation language nor incorporation of AAA rules established her consent, as beneficiary or representative, to delegate claims arising solely from Mark’s use (¶¶ 42–45, 63).

FAA section 2 reinforced that contractual connection: these claims arose from Mark’s distinct transaction, leaving the statutory foundation for enforcing Sheridan’s delegation unmet (¶¶ 47–49). *Henry Schein* bars a “wholly groundless” exception after valid delegation, but preserves the antecedent judicial inquiry into consent. The court resolved that inquiry rather than weighing an arbitration argument after established delegation (¶¶ 54–60, 62).

The court then decided underlying arbitrability. Sheridan was not a signatory to Mark’s agreement, and her individual agreement expressed no consent to arbitrate this third-person-use wrongful death dispute in her representative or beneficiary capacity. Uber established neither delegation nor agreement to arbitrate the underlying claims (¶¶ 72–74).

## Disposition and limits

The court reversed the appellate judgment, affirmed the circuit judgment, and remanded. Wrongful death proceedings may resume; survival counts remain voluntarily dismissed (¶¶ 76–79). It expressly declined to decide procedural or substantive unconscionability (¶ 74). Its decision addresses arbitration, leaving the pleaded negligence and wrongful death merits for further proceedings (¶¶ 6, 76). The court acknowledged a fine distinction between delegation scope and initial consent, and inconsistent decisions elsewhere (¶ 67).